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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANGELA ALVARADO, an Infant, 
by Hortence Alvarado, Her Guard-
ian Ad Litem, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
RONALD TUCKER and HAROLD 
N. TUCKER, 




STATEMENT OF '11HE CASE 
Plaintiff has appealed from a directed verdict ren-
dered follo\ving the conclusion of Plaintiff's evidence at 
the trial of the above rna tter in the District ·court of 
Weber County, State of Utah. The action was originally 
commenced by the Plaintiff minor to recover injuries 
alleged to have been sustained as a result of the negli-
gence of the Defendants. By their Answer, Defendants 
denied negligence on their part and in turn alleged that 
the Plaintiff minor was guilty of negligence proximately 
contributing to cause her own injuries. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
rrhe accident, 'vith respect to which this case was 
filed, occurred on the 17th day of March, 1952, at about 
() :30 o'clock p.m. The Defendant Ronald Tucker was 
proceeding in a southerly direction on Eccles Avenue 
between 22nd and 23rd Streets in Ogden, Utah, when the 
Plai11tiff minor, Angela Alvarado, suddenly left the side-
walk on the east side of Eccles Avenue and ran out into 
the street, behind an automobile approaching the auto-
mobile being operated by the Defendant Ronald Tucker, 
and in such a way as to come suddenly in front of the 
Defendants' car, being struck on the left front part of 
the vehicle (Tr. 15, 16). At that time, the Defendant 
Ronald Tucker was operating his father's automobile; 
and because he 'vas a minor under the age of 18 years, 
liability 'vas also claimed against the Defendant Harold 
N. Tucker. 
With the Plaintiff minor, at the time of the accident, 
were several playmates, including Plaintiff's brother (Tr. 
8, 13, 14). Plaintiff was then of the age of 11 years and 
was attending the 4th grade in school (Tr. 7). She lived 
on the east side of the street, on the corner of Eccles Ave. 
and 22nd Street (Tr. 8, 13). Prior to the accident, she 
and four other children 'vere playing tag, running up 
and down the sidewalk on the east side of the street and 
sometimes running across the street to the west side (Tr. 
13, 14). Just before the collision occurred, Angela's 
brother was chasing Angela and her girl friend, Karen 
Norton (Tr. 14) . .As they ran along the sidewalk they 
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started out into the street, at which time they sa\v a car 
proceeding from the south to the north, so that they 
hesitated, ran along the side of the car bet\veen it and 
the curb, and then as the car 'vent by proceeded to run 
out into the street again to cross over to the west side 
in order to avoid Angela's brother (Tr. 15, 16). Angela 
did not look to see if there were any cars coming from 
the other direction. She was running as fast as she could 
to get away from her brother (Tr. 16). Karen was 
slightly ahead and therefore got farther across before 
the automobile struck the Plaintiff (Tr. 16). She was 
merely touched by the side of the car and not hurt (Tr. 
24). Plaintiff never did see l\1r. Tucker's automobile nor 
hear any brakes or any sound before she was struck (Tr. 
18). Plaintiff's mother had told her several times not 
to play in the street and Plaintiff testified she knew she 
should not play out in the street ( Tr. 13). Her teacher 
in school had also instructed her a bout not playing in 
the street (Tr. 17). 
The driver of the approaching car was not called 
as a "ritness, but two people in the neighborhood were 
called by the Plaintiff to testify with respect to what 
they heard and sa"r· William Glen Norton, who lived at 
2268 Eccles A venue (on the east side. of the street), was 
fixing a light on his porch at a bout 6 :30 in the evening 
of March 17, 1952, when the accident occurred. He heard 
a screech of brakes and turned to see his little sister 
( l{aren) pushed off the side of the car ( Tr. 24). He ran 
out into the street and sa"7" that Angela was lying in 
front of the ear, about 10 to 15 feet a\Yay from it (Tr. 
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23). Prior to the sereeching of the brakes, he had heard 
the ehildren s<-reaming, playing in the street (Tr. 26). 
rrhe \\~itness did not see the impact, nor did he see any 
tire skid marks on the street on the evening of the acci-
dent ( rrr. 26, 27). rrhe next day he went out and saw 
some skid marks in the street but he could not tell 
whether they were in the same location where the acci-
dent took place or not (Tr. 27). 
Dorothy W ar<lleigh testified that she resided in 
Ogden and '"as visiting at the 11acFarland residence, at 
:2273 Eccles .A. Yenue, \Vhen the accident occurred. It was 
bet,veen 6 :30 and 6 :45 and was dark outside ( Tr. 34). 
~he heard a sereech of brakes and turned and looked out 
of the windo'Y and sa'v ear lights over the end of her car 
that was parked out in front. It looked, to the witness, 
as if the car \\Tas going to strike her car and then she 
sa\\'" it hit an object ,,,.hich was thro,vn into the air. She 
immediately ran out and saw a little girl lying in the 
street in front of the Tucker automobile (Tr. 33}. She 
later testified that she \vas outside when she heard the 
screeching of brakes (Tr. 34). She also testified that 
she saw no skid marks that evening, but the next day 
remembered seeing some skid marks in the street (Tr. 
36, 37). 
Mr. A. J. MacFarland testified that he resided at 
2273 Eccles Ave. in Ogden and \vas 65 years of age; that 
the day following the accident he went out and saw some 
skid marks on the street and stepped them off down the 
street and "that was about 17 steps. Seventeen good 
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steps of skid marks, that is what I sa'v when I went out 
into the street the next day.'' He further estimated that 
would be about 50 feet (Tr. 43). He never took any actual 
measurements and the skid marks consisted of two lines 
(Tr. 44). 
Although the Police Offieers who investigated the 
accident at the scene shortly after it happened \vere not 
called as "ritnesses, the Plaintiff did call LeRoy G. Ben-
nett, a Sgt. on the Ogden Police Force, to testify with 
respect to the brake marks described by the \vitness, 
J\!IacFarland. The Officer testified that the speed limit 
on Eccles Avenue was 25 miles per hour (Tr. 65). On 
the basis of 80% coefficient of friction for the highway 
and assuming that the vehicle had laid down 50 feet of 
brake marks for each of the four wheels of the automo-
bile, the Sgt. testified that the car \vould have been 
traveling at a speed of approximately 35 miles per hour. 
However, on cross examination he admitted that if the 
entire overall distance of brake marks was 50 feet each 
wheel would probably have traveled approximately 40 
feet (giving allowance for the difference between the 
front and the rear wheels of a normal automobile). Thus 
assuming a coefficient of friction of 65% which would 
be possible in the instant street the Sgt. testified that 
the speed of the Yehicle would be between 25 and 30 miles 
per hour (1.,r. 66). 
l\Irs. Alvarado testified that she had not been at 
home until about 6 :00; that she had allowed Angela to 
go out to play after dark on the evening in question. She 
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tPHtified that Angela was a sensible girl, ''She knows 
\\'hat dangers there are in getting out in the street"; 
that she \\'as smart enough in school and got good marks. 
She testified that she had told Angela not to go out into 
the street and that Ang-(~la seemed to understand that 
she \vas not to leave the sidewalk and go into the street 
(Tr. 76). The witness further testified that she knew 
that her children on occasion played in the street, that 
\\'as \vhy she told Angelo not to do so. 
The foregoing constitutes all of the testimony sub-
mitted by the Plaintiff in connection with the accident 
and upon which it \\·as sought to establish liability of 
the Defendants. At the conclusion of Plaintiff's testi-
mony Defendants made a motion for directed verdict 
\vhich was granted by the Court. The motion for directed 
verdict was stated by counsel to be on the following 
grounds: 
'' 1. That as a matter of la\v the Plaintiffs have 
failed to show that the Defendants, or either of them, 
was negligent in any respect proximately causing the 
injuries to the Plaintiff minor. 
"2. That the evidence shows as a matter of law 
that the Plaintiff minor was guilty of negligence proxi-
mately causing the injuries which she sustained and 
therefore cannot recover.'' 
In granting Defendant's Motion, the Court stated: 
''In this case the Defense has moved for a· 
directed verdict on the basis of the evidence that 
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is in. N o,Y, the evidence, the undeniable evidence, 
is that-the uncontradicted evidence is that it was 
dark. The children were playing on the sidewalk. 
There is no evidence that the driver could have 
seen the children outside of his headlights, whether 
they v.rere high or low. The child ran from one 
automobile, around directly from back of that 
other automobile. On the basis of that the Court 
will direct that the Jury retire, elect a foreman 
and bring back a verdict of no cause of action.'' 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
It would thus appear, as stated by Appellant, that 
the Court granted Defendants' Motion on both grounds 
and, therefore, .that the issues before the Supreme Court 
are: 
1. Whether as a matter of law the evidence fails 
to show negligence on the part of the Defendant proxi-
mately causing the accident. 
2. Whether the evidence shows as a matter of law 
that the Appellant was negligent proximately contribu-
ting to cause her own injuries. 
If either of the foregoing propositions is supported 
by the evidence, then the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. Respondents will proceed to discuss 
the foregoing points in the order indicated and as set 
forth in .1\ppellant's Brief. 
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ARGUMENrl: 
I 
AS .L\ MATTER OF LAW THE EVIDENCE 
F.,AILS rro SHOW RESPONDENTS WERE NEGLI-
G-ENT WHICH l)ROXII\1ATELY CAUSED PLAIN-
TI~-.,F'8 INJURIES. 
The burden is upon the Plaintiff to establish the 
negligence of the Defendants, and in the absence of 
testimony of negligence the Court could not have sub-
mitted the matter to the Jury. The sole and only grounds 
of negligence upon which the Plaintiff attempted to rely 
at the trial, and like"\\rise the only ground asserted on 
appeal, is that the Defendant Ronald Tucker drove at 
an excessi Ye rate of speed. There ":ras no direct testi-
mony as to the speed of the automobile. Although there 
\vere three passengers in the car in \Yhich the Defendant 
Tucker \Vas driving, none of them \vere called to testify. 
The witnesses at the scene of the accident did not describe 
the movements of the car nor testify as to any speed of 
the vehicle. The \vitnesses \vho \vere in the automobile 
approaching from the opposite direction were not called 
to testify, and, like\vise, the Police Officers, who investi-
gated the accident and \vho wo"uld have been most likely 
to have known of the existence of any brake marks left 
by the Defendants' automobile, were not called as wit-
nesses. 
The sole argument advanced by Appellant as to 
excessive speed on the part of the Defendant is that one 
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or t\YO of the "'"itnesses heard the screech of brakes; that 
the follO\\'"ing- day one of the neighbors \vent out, saw 
some brake marks in the street, and proceeded to step 
them off to the distance of 17 steps. The witness (Mr. 
~IacFarland) admitted that he made no exact measure-
ments, nor did he know the length of one of his steps, 
but he estimated the distance to be approximately 50 
feet. In the first place, "\Ve 'vish to point out, there is 
no evidence to tie up the brake marks observed by the 
\vitness the following· day with any brake marks left by 
the Tucker automobile on the night of the accident. 
Both the witnesses, Dorothy Wardleigh and William 
Glen Norton, testified that they saw no brake marks 
there on the night of the accident (Tr. 27, 36). Neither 
of these witnesses testified that the automobile traveled 
any distance after the impact, although they both ap-
parently turned to see the car at about the time that 
the impact occurred. It is apparent that the automobile 
could not have been traveling at any considerable speed 
at the moment of impact because the Norton child, who 
was struck by the right front of the automobile, continued 
to run around the car and into the house and was not 
hurt (Tr. 26). There was no testimony as to how far 
the car traveled after the moment of impact, nor as to 
what speed it was traveling at the moment of impact 
or at any time before. 
With respect to the brake marks, Respondents ob-
jected to the \vitness MacFarland testifying as to his 
measurements. Likewise objection \\'"as made to the tes-
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iiinony of Sgt. Bennett, who gave an opinion of the speed 
of a vehicle based upon a purely hypothetical question. 
rrhe objections were based on the grounds that it had 
not been established that the marks were left by the 
rrucker automobile, and further that the evidence with 
respect to the speed of any vehicle whic~ might have 
made such marks could not be calculated under the evi-
dence of this ~ase. It is Respondents' position now that 
the Court improperly overruled the objections and erred 
in failing to strike the testimony after it was received. 
However, even though the testimony 'vas there, the most 
that can be argued from it by Appellant is that the auto-
mobile of the Defendant Tucker was traveling between 
25 and 30 miles per hour. This is based upon the testi-
mony of Sgt. Bennett to the effect that if the overall 
length of the skid marks 'vas 50 feet (and we wish to 
point out that the testimony as to that distance is very 
Yague and indefinite), then it would be necessary to 
subtract from that the 'vheel base of the vehicle in order 
to determine the length of the skid marks for the front 
and back wheels. Thus the distance would be reduced 
from 50 to approximately 40 feet. Based upon 40 feet 
of skid marks with a coefficient of friction of 65%, which 
Sgt. Bennett testified could be possible in this case, the 
speed of the vehicle 'vould have been somewhere between 
25 and 30 miles per hour. Certainly such speed, under 
all the facts and circumstances of this case, would not 
justify the finding of negligence nor under any circum-
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The testimony is undisputed by the Plaintiff herself 
that she and her friend Karen were being chased by 
Plaintiff's brother, and that they started to run out into 
the street when they sa'v a car coming from the south 
toward the north just about where Plaintiff ran out (Tr. 
15). When Plaintiff saw this car, she turned to the left 
and ran along the side of it next to the sidewalk and ran 
out again from beliind that car and directly across the 
street 'vithout stopping (Tr. 15, 16). At that time Plain-
tiff 'vas running as fast as she could to get away from 
her brother (Tr. 16). It is further undisputed that at 
the time it was dark and that the headlights on the auto-
mobiles were on. Thus as the Defendant Tucker pro-
ceeded south along Eccles Avenue and approaching the 
automobile coming toward the north with its headlights 
on, he was not· in any position to see the two small 
children on the opposite side of the approaching auto-
mobile until after they had run out from behind that 
car and directly into his path. Certainly it would have 
been impossible for anyone traveling at any speed to 
have stopped in sufficient time to have avoided the 
collision. 
And the fact, even if it be assumed to be the fact, 
that Respondent Tucker was traveling between 25 and 
30 miles per hour could not in any way be held to be 
the proximate cause of the collision between the Tucker 
automobile and the Plaintiff minor. There was no pre-
vious warning to the Defendant that the children were 
playing in the street nor that anyone would be out on 
the street at the time that he passed by. It was early 
11 
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Spring and snow was still on the ground (Tr. 13). As 
far as the record shows, the Defendant had not traveled 
in that direction at any time prior to the evening in 
question and 'vas not in any way acquainted or familiar 
with the area so as to know whether any children were 
in the habit of playing around on the street at night. At 
that time of the evening in that time of the year, it could 
not be said that Defendant should have anticipated that 
persons of any age would be out of the street reserved 
for travel by motor vehicle. It was not at or near a 
corner or intersection, but was down toward the middle 
of the block where the accident occurred. 
In this case, the Plaintiff had the burden of proof 
to show Defendants to be negligent, and that such negli-
gence was the proximate cause of the accident and re-
sulting injuries sustained. If this burden was not main-
tained, then the Court properly granted the motion for 
a directed verdict. See Casereo vs. Hurst, (Ind. 1951), 
99 N. E. 2d 440. As stated by the Supreme Court of 
Michigan in the case of Colvaruso vs. Stroh Brewery 
Company, 301 Mich. 245, 3 N. W. 2d 261, "The verdict 
may not rest upon conjecture or a reconstruction of 
events which have no evidentiary foundation.'' See also 
Spackman vs. Benefit Assn. of Ry. Employees, 97 Ut. 91, 
89 P. 2d 490. 
In the case of Cederloff vs. Whited, 110 Ut. 45, 169 
P. 2d 777, this Court determined that the Plaintiff driver 
was not negligent proximately contributing to the acci-
dent who operated his automobile at a speed of 25 to 
12 
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30 miles per hour in a business zone on his proper side 
of the street when approaching a vehicle proceeding in 
the opposite direction and about to make a left turn 
across the high\Yay in front of the Plaintiff's car. 
In the case of Abrahams vs. Rice, 306 Mass. 24, 27 
N. E. 2d 193, an appeal was taken to the Supreme Judicial 
Court of }[assachusetts from an order of the Appellate 
DiYision vacating a finding for the Plaintiff and entering 
judgment for the Defendant. The Plaintiff in that case 
\vas a school girl nearly eight years of age who left an 
automobile bus and ran around in front of the bus across 
the street, being struck by Defendant's automobile. In 
affirming the judgment for the Defendant the Court 
held: 
''The mere happening of the accident was not 
evidence that any negligence of the defendant had 
a causal relation to its occurrence. Liability rests 
solely upon negligence and the absence of the 
latter makes impossible the existence of the for-
mer. There was no evidence that the speed at 
which the defendant was operating her automobile 
was unreasonable or improper, or that, in passing 
the bus, which did not start until after the acci-
dent, the defendant was guilty of any breach of 
duty that she .o"'\ved the plaintiff. We are unable 
to find any evidence that would warrant a finding 
that the defendant could see the plaintiff for more 
than an instant before the accident or that, after 
her presence in the street was discovered, the 
defendant failed to act as a reasonably prudent 
person in attempting to avert the accident. The 
ruling that the evidence did not warrant a finding 
that the defendant was negligent should have been 
given by the trial judge.'' 
13 
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See also Rose vs. Silveira, 318 Mass. 709, 63 N. E. 
2d 895. 
In both of the above mentioned cases, the evidence 
as to speed is limited to the testimony of the Defendant 
who testified he was traveling at a very slow rate. In 
the case of Welch vs. Herman, 337 Ill. App. 322, 86 N. E. 
2d 284, the Court was concerned with evidence of brake 
marks, which, it was contended, was some evidence of 
speed. Other witnesses who testified indicated speed of 
less than 35 miles per hour. The Court held that, from 
the evidence, the only verdict which the Jury was justi-
fied in finding was for the Defendant, stating: 
''None of the testimony set out above indicates 
what the speed of the Appellee's car was at the 
time of or just prior to the time of the accident. 
Mr. Schaefer's testimony does indicate that at 
sometime the Appellee was going more than 20 
miles per hour; even assuming this to be true, 
this testimony in and of itself does not establish 
negligent conduct proximately or directly causing 
the accident in question. Nor has the Appellant 
introduced into this case any ordinance or statute 
which was violated by Appellee's conduct. Taking 
all of the evidence into consideration, the jury had 
no choice but to find for the Appellee.'' 
In the case of Klink vs. Bany, 207 Ia. 1241, 224 N. W. 
540, the Plaintiff, age seven, alighted from an automobile 
stopped on the right hand side of the road, ran around 
behind the back of the car and across the road in front 
of an automobile approaching from the opposite direc-
tion. In reversing a judgment for the Plaintiff and 
14 
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directing that a judgment for the Defendant be entered, 
the Court said : 
"It is a defined and well-settled rule of law in 
this state that a driYer of a motor vehicle is not 
legally bound 'to anticipate or know the intentions 
or purpose' of a person, 'vho being in a zone of 
safety immediately prior to a collision with said 
vehicle, suddenly and without warning enters a 
zone of danger, resulting in an injury to said per-
son by reason of a collision with the vehicle. . . . 
The only legal conclusion that can be drawn from 
the case on both the law and the fact side is that 
it 'vas a case of inevitable accident, and therefore 
the theory of nonliability a.pplied. . . . The de-
fendant was under no obligation to give a warn-
ing signal. There is no evidence that the defend-
ant was not driving his car in a careful and pru-
dent manner, or that he did not have his car under 
control as he approached the part of the highway 
where the plaintiff suddenly dashed out from be-
hind another car, thereby coming in contact with 
the defendant's car .... We view this case as one 
of inevitable accident. The defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict and for a new trial should 
have been sustained.'' 
In Crutchley vs. Bruce, 214 Ia. 731, 240 N. W. 238, 
decedent was eight years of age when he was killed by 
Defendant's 'vestbound automobile when he emerged 
from behind a milk truck. The boy had ridden on the 
milk truck for a short distance and when it stopped 
opposite the entrance to his home he alighted and ran 
around behind it to the rear of a truck proceeding in 
the same direction and then out into the street directly 
in front of the Defendant's westbound automobile going 
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45 to 50 miles an hour approaching the parked milk 
truck. In reversing a judgment for the Plaintiff, the 
Court held that Defendant's speed was not causally re-
lated to the accident and stated: 
' 'It cannot be said that a person of ordinary 
and reasonable care and prudence is guilty of 
negligence in not anticipating that from behind 
every standing vehicle he may pass on the high-
way some pedestrian may suddenly dash into the 
pathway of his car, and that he is guilty of negli-
gence in not giving a signal of his presence in 
passing every such standing vehicle. . . . As we 
have seen, the speed of the automobile was not 
the proximate cause of the injury to intestate, nor 
"\vas the [defendant], under the facts shown in the 
record, guilty of negligence in not sounding his 
horn ... when about to pass the milk truck." 
In Watson 1)8. Home Mutual Insurance, 215 Ia. 670, 
246 N. W. 255, Plaintiff was ten years of age and was 
retrieving foul balls outside a ball park. As he was 
picking up a ball in the ditch on the opposite side of the 
road he saw an approaching vehicle "some distance to 
the east''. Upon getting the ball he climbed up to the 
level of the road and started running toward the ball 
park without looking further to the east. He ran between 
two parked automobiles and as he came out into the 
driving lane ran 10 or 11 feet before he was struck by 
the approaching truck just beyond the center of the 
roadway. The truck was going about 30 miles per hour. 
The Supreme Court affirmed a directed verdict stating: 
"The only opportunity that (he) had to ob-
serve the boy and to take any precaution for his 
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safety 'vas that period of time which transpired 
'vhile the boy 'vas running a distance of eleven 
feet. This is the equivalent of saying that he had 
no opportunity at all.'' 
The above case is very similar to the case now before 
the Court, except for the fact that the accident there 
occurred in the day time "\vhile in the instant matter the 
accident occurred at night. 
In Rodriguez vs. Abadie, (La. App.), 168 So. 515, the 
Plaintiff's daughter was 12 years of age and darted into 
the street from behind a parked vehicle at the curb. The 
vehicle was traveling about 25 miles per hour. The Ap-
pellate Court affirmed the trial court's determination 
of no cause of action not only upon the ground that the 
"proximate, direct cause of the accident was the act of 
the plaintiff's child in darting, from behind a parked 
automobile, into the open roadway'', but also on the 
ground that defendant was without fault. 
See also, Conte vs. Mizzoni, (Mass.), 11 N. E. 2d 496; 
Preger vs. Gomory, (Fla.), 52 So. 2d 541; Boyd vs. 
Brown, 192 V a. 702, 66 S. E. 2d 559; Joplin vs. Fra.nz, 
(Miss. App. 1952), 240 s·. W. 2d 209. 
II 
PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBU-
rrORY NEGLIGENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
While we agree with the statement made by Appel-
lant that a person of tender years is generally assumed 
''not to have the same consciousness of danger and the 
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same judgment in avoiding it as an adult,'' nevertheless, 
such children are required to exercise that degree of 
care which a reasonably prudent person of similar age 
and discretion would exercise under the same or similar 
circumstances. And where the evidence clearly estab-
lishes, as it does in the present case, that a minor child 
is conscious of a dangerous condition and fails to exer-
cise reasonable care for her own safety, she should not 
be entitled to recover. Plaintiff Angela Alvarado testi-
fied that she knew she should not play in the street; that 
she had been so instructed by both her mother and her 
teachers ; that when she first turned out to start over 
into the street there was a car going north on Eccles 
Avenue which just about ran over her. She then ran 
along the side of the car next to the sidewalk and out 
from behind the moving car and across the street again 
without looking to see if any cars were coming from the 
other direction (Tr. 15, 16). She testified further that 
she knew when children run across the street in front 
of automobiles there is danger, and that she didn't know 
why she ran out behind the one car and across the street 
without looking for the other automobile; that since the 
accident she has not played out in the street (Tr. ·18). 
Mrs. Alvarado testified that she had always told Angela 
to stay out of the street; that her daughter was a sensible 
girl and knew the dangers of playing in the street (Tr. 
75). She further testified that she knew her children 
liked to play out in the street because the neighbor 
children did it and that V\ras the reason she had previously 
told her not to play out on the street (Tr. 76). Mrs. 
Alvarado also stated that she customarily let Angela go 
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out to play after dark until 8:00 o'clock and that on the 
night in question she did not expect her to go into the 
street but thought she would play in front of her girl 
friend's house (Tr. 75, 76). 
vVhile the diagram prepared on the blackboard dur-
ing the trial was not offered in evidence, the Court Re-
porter has attempted to make a reproduction of it in the 
Transcript of Testimony (Tr. 47). This diagram would 
indicate that the accident happened approximately 3,4 of 
the way between 22nd and 23rd Streets, so that it was 
not at any point near a cross,valk or other designated 
place where pedestrians are permitted to cross the street. 
Our Supreme Court has previously determined that a 
person attempting to cross a street who either fails to 
look, or having looked fails to see what he should see, is 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Mingus vs. 
Olsson, 114 Utah 505, 201 P. 2d 495; Cox vs. Thompson, 
(1953), 254 P. 2d 1047. 
While the above cases refer to adult pedestrians, 
nevertheless, the same principal of law would be applic-
able to a minor child who is sufficiently old enough to 
understand and capable of comprehending danger, such 
as was involved in the instant case, and who failed to 
exercise any care or take any precaution to avoid injury. 
Thus in the case of Gt·aham vs. Johnson, 109 Utah 345, 
166 P. 2d 230, the Court held that a thirteen year old 
Plaintiff was guilty of negligence while playing in the 
street (although liabiilty was imposed upon the Defend-
ant on the doctrine of last clear chance). 
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In the case of Bird vs. Meade, 281 Mich. 114, 274 N. 
W. 730, a t"relve year old girl was held to have been 
contributorily negligent as a matter of law. Decedent 
and her girl friend crossed the highway in front of the 
school to procure apples from a wagon facing east on 
the south side of the highway. After obtaining the 
apples, they ran around to the rear of the wagon and 
darted across the highway to return to the school house 
when decedent was struck by an automobile coming from 
the east and passing the wagon where the girls had 
obtained the apples. The Court stated that it appeared 
under the circumstances that neither of the girls saw 
the approaching car in their attempt to return to the 
school house, and commented: 
''The evidence shows that the decedent was ... 
in the eighth grade, was considered by her teacher 
an excellent student, had been warned of the 
dangers of traffic on (this highway) even as late 
as the morning of the accident, and had sufficient 
intelligence to appreciate the danger of running 
across the road without stopping and looking for 
oncoming cars. The above facts clearly establish 
contributory negligence.'' 
In the case of Volkman.n vs. Fidelity and Guaranty 
Company of New York, 252 Wis. 464, 32 N. W. 2d 348, 
the Court, in discussing contributory negligence of a 
Plaintiff minor held: 
''Appellant boy was seven years, 4 months, 18 
days old at the time of the accident. As was stated 
in the former opinion, he was bright, well-trained, 
and knew the dangers of crossing busy streets 
between intersections. A boy of his age, training, 
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and Pxperience "~ho blindly runs into a city street 
at n point other than at an intersection without 
looking "~here he is traveling and being in no 
position to yield the right-of-way to oncoming 
traffic, is guilty of causal negligence as a matter 
of law' as held by the trial court." 
In the case of Thomas vs. Siegman, 301 Ill. App. 627, 
22 N. E. 2d 476, the Court in a memorandum decision 
affirmed a directed verdict for the Defendant on the 
ground of contributory negligence on the part of the 
Plaintiff minor child. The syllabus to the opinion main-
tains the following: 
''A physically normal 12-year-old boy, who 
heedlessly left the street curb in front of his home 
on a dark, foggy night and ran across the street 
in the middle of the block and into the path of 
defendant's automobile, which was approaching 
at a speed of between 30 and 35 miles per hour 
and "rhich was burning lights observable through 
fog for more than 100 feet, was guilty of contri-
butory negligence as a matter of law precluding 
his recovery from defendant for injuries received 
when the boy was hit by defendant's automobile.'' 
See also Busby vs. Levy, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 946; Duval vs. 
Palmer, 113 Vt. 389, 34 A. 2d 317; Fontinot vs. Freuden--
stein, (La. App.), 119 So. 677; Gauthier vs. Foote, (La. 
App.), 19 So. 2d 9. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion Respondents respectfully submit to 
the Court that the accident in this ease was proximately 
caused by the negligence of the Plaintiff minor in dart-
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ing out from behind a moving vehicle directly in the 
path of Respondents' automobile coming from the oppo-
site direction at a time when the latter was unable to 
observe the Plaintiff child in sufficient time to avoid a 
collision. rrhe most favorable position which might be 
taken for the Plaintiff would be that the accident was 
unavoidable. Certainly it was unavoidable on the part 
of the Respondent Ronald Tucker who had no oppor-
tunity to stop or otherwise turn out before the impact 
and who, as a matter of law, was free from negligence. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN 
NIELSEN & CONDER 
Attorneys for Respondents 
510 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah . 
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